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Abstract
A rst-order formulation of Le´sniewskis ontology is formulated
and shown to be interpretable within a free rst-order logic of identity
extended to include nominal quantication over proper and common-
name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in
monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the rst-order
part of Le´sniewskis ontology is decidable.
One of the important applications of Le´sniewskis system of ontology,
sometimes also called the logic of (proper and common) names1, has been as
a logistic framework that can be used in the reconstruction of medieval ter-
minist logic.2 This is especially so because the basic relation of Le´sniewskis
system, singular inclusion, amounts to a version of the two-name theory of
the copula.3 An alternative reconstruction of medieval terminist logic can
also be given within the logistic framework of conceptual realism, however.4
This system is preferable in part because, unlike Le´sniewskis ontology, it is
not committed to an extensional framework, which is important in the logi-
cal analysis of the tensed and modal modication (ampliation) of the terms
(names) of medieval logic.5 It is also possible, as we show below, to reduce or
1See, e.g. [Lejewski 1958], p. 152, [Slupecki 1955] and [Iwanu´s 1973].
2See, e.g., [Henry 1972].
3Singular inclusion, as represented by " in the formula a " b, read as a is b, was the
only undened constant of Le´sniewskis original system of ontology. The system could
also be based either on partial, weak or strong inclusion as the only primitive as well. See
[Lejewski 1958]. pp. 154-156.
4See [Cocchiarella 2001]. For an account of conceptual realism as a formal ontology see
[Cocchiarella 1996].
5One might, of course, add tense and modal operators to Le´sniewskis ontology, even
though he himself was against such a move.
1
reconstruct Le´sniewskis ontology within the logistic framework of conceptual
realism.
1 Le´sniewskis Ontology as a First-Order
Theory
There are three main parts to Le´sniewskis general logistic framework. These
are (1) a version of the simple theory of types, which he called the system of
semantic categories and which includes protothetic, (2) the system of ontol-
ogy as based on the relation of singular inclusion, and (3) mereology as based
on the relation of part to whole.6 We will not deal with mereology here at
all. Protothetic, which is a quanticational logic over propositions and n-ary
truth functions, for each positive integer n, is an interesting, but redundant
part of the theory of types insofar as the logic is functionally complete, i.e.,
insofar as every n-ary truth function can be represented in the logic.7 Aside
from mereology, in other words, Le´sniewskis logistic framework is essentially
equivalent to the theory of simple types plus the system of ontology.8 For
our purposes here, however, even the theory of simple types can be ignored.
Instead, we will represent Le´sniewskis system of ontology as an applied rst-
order logic with " as a two-place predicate constant representing the relation
of singular inclusion as its only primitive descriptive constant. This is suf-
cient, we believe, because the logistic framework of conceptual realism is
equivalent to the simple theory of types, and hence to the nonelementray
part of Le´sniewskis system of ontology; and also because, as we show here, a
representation, or reduction, of the elementary part of Le´sniewskis ontology
can be given within a certain extension of the identity logic of the rst-order
part of the framework of conceptual realism.
It should be noted, however, that Le´sniewskis theory of denitions for
constant names and name-forming functors does not always satisfy the con-
ditions for noncreativity that denitions are required to satisfy in standard
rst-order theories. For that reason we do not include such denitions in
6See [Slupecki 1955] for a description of (1) and (2).
7There are only a nite number of n-ary truth-functions for each positive integer n, and
hence quantication over these truth-functions is equivalent to a conjunction or disjunction
of n many conjuncts or disjuncts in which, ultimately, such quantication does not occur.
See [Church 1956], §28.
8See [Slupecki 1955] for justication of this claim.
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the rst-order theory described below. There is a certain extension of this
rst-order theory, however, for which the noncreativity conditions of these
denitions can be proved.9 The axioms of this extension are also reducible,
it turns out, to the part of the conceptualist logic of identity described below
in section two. In other words, Le´sniewskis system of elementary ontol-
ogy, as it sometimes called, is reducible to this conceptualist logic.10 We
will briey sketch the proof for this claim in section four.
The so-called nominal (or name) variables a; b; c; d (with or with-
out numerical subscripts) of Le´sniewskis system of ontology, for which the
symbolic counterparts of shared, unshared or ctitious names, proper or com-
mon, can be substituted, will be taken to be the individual variables of our
rst-order version of the system. That is, the symbolic names that are the
substituends of these variables (in particular applications of the ontology)
are assumed to represent common names (common count nouns), including
the ultimate superordinate common name thing, as well as proper names.
The symbolic counterparts of ctitious names i.e. vacuous names, whether
proper or common, such as Pegasusand unicorn are also assumed to be
legitimate substituends of the nominal variables. The symbolic counterparts
of complex common names, such as thing that is red, are also names in the
sense intended, which is an indirect way of including adjectives as names.
For the formula a " bto be true, however, the name amust denote and be
unshared, i.e. amust then name exactly one thing.
The identity sign, =, which is used to represent the so-called strong
identityof ontology, is not a primitive symbol of the system, but is dened
instead as follows11:
Denition 1 a = b$ a " b ^ b " a:
Note that for a = bto be true, both aand bmust be unshared names
of the same thing. This means that when ais a shared or vacuous name,
9See [Iwanu´s 1973].
10We should perhaps emphasize that, as described in [Iwanu´s 1973], there are no in-
ference rules for the system of elementary ontology, EO, other than those for standard
rst-order logic without identity. That is, Le´sniewskis rules for denitions are eliminable
in EO.
11We use!, :, ^, _,$ as the (material) conditional, negation, conjunction, disjunction,
and biconditional signs, and 8, and 9 as the universal and particular quantiers. For
convenience of logical details, we assume that !, :, and 8 are the only primitive logical
constants, and that the others are dened in terms of these in the standard way.
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a = awill be false, which means that we do not have (8a)(a = a)as a valid
thesis of the system. With weak identity, however, the situation is di¤erent.
Weak identity, sometimes also called equality, is mutual subordination (or
inclusion), which is dened as follows12:
Denition 2 a  b$ (8c)(c " a$ c " b):
Unlike a = a, the strong identity of a with itself, the weak identity of a
is unproblematic, i.e. (8a)(a  a) is a valid thesis. Indeed, it might well
be preferable to use for strong identity and =for weak identity instead,
because then we would not have the appearance of conict with the logic of
identity (which is reexive) when in fact there is no real conict.13
In taking the symbolic counterparts of names, both proper and common,
vacuous or otherwise, as substituends of the bound individual variables, we
do not mean that quantication is to be interpreted substitutionally. That
is, even though
'(c=a)! (9a)'(a)
is a valid thesis (and in fact is the contrapositive of a logical axiom14) re-
gardless whether c is a shared, unshared or ctitious name, this does not
mean that quantiers indexed by nominal variables must be interpreted sub-
stitutionally. Some authors, however, while maintaining that quantication
in Le´sniewskis ontology should not be interpreted substitutionally, go on
to claim that it also cannot be interpreted referentially. This is so, accord-
ing to these authors, because there are more names than there are objects
(or so they claim).15 The implicit assumption, apparently, is that every ob-
ject (including every grain of sand and every microparticle of the universe)
12See, e.g., [Küng & Canty 1970], p. 166.
13In [Iwanu´s 1973], the identity sign, =, is used in the sense we suggest, i.e. as co-
extensivity with respect to ".
14As logical axioms we assume all tautologous formulas as well as all instances of the
following schemas:
(8a)'(a)! '(c=a);
(8a)['!  ]! [(8a)'! (8a) ];
[! (8a)];
where a is not free in , and c is free for a in ':Modus ponens and universal generalization
will su¢ ce as inference rules
15See [Küng & Canty 1970], pp.169f.
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has a unique unshared name, and that in addition to these there are many
shared and ctitious names as well. The interpretation we give below in
our conceptualist reduction of ontology does not depend on such a dubious
assumption, however; nor does it assume that quantication with respect to
nominal variables must be substitutional.
Finally, the only nonlogical axiom of ontology (i.e. the only axiom in
addition to the logical axioms and inference rules of rst-order predicate
logic without identity) is the following:
(8a)(8b)[a " b$ (9c)c " a^ (8c)(c " a! c " b)^ (8c)(8d)(c " a^d " a! c " d)]:
We will show in section three below that a conceptualist interpretation of "
translates this axiom into a theorem of our extended (free) rst-order logic
of identity.
2 The Logic of Names in Conceptual Realism
The logistic framework of conceptual realism is an extension of second-
order predicate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms.
All predicate expressions of the system, including complex predicates gen-
erated by means of the -abstraction operator, stand for predicable con-
cepts, which are taken to be the cognitive capacities underlying our rule-
following abilities in the use of the predicates and verb phrases of natural
language. Nominalized predicates, on the other hand, denote the intensional
contents of the concepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates
though some nominalized predicates, such as that for the Russell predicate
[x(9F )(x = F ^ :F (x))], will in fact denote nothing (as a value of the
bound individual variables). For this reason the rst-order part of the logic,
which includes the identity sign =as a logical constant, is free of existen-
tial presuppositions.16 This logic has been shown to be consistent relative to
weak Zermelo set theory, and, as already noted, it is equivalent to the simple
theory of types, including Le´sniewskis system of semantic categories.
16Of course the identity sign as used in this logic is not to be confused with the sign for
strong identity in Le´sniewskis system. Because the latter is a dened, and not a primitive,
constant of Le´sniewskis ontology, we will not concern ourselves with it in the remainder
of this paper, i.e. hereafter we mean by =only the identity sign of the logic of conceptual
realism.
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As with Le´sniewskis logistic framework, we will not concern ourselves
here with the full logistic framework of conceptual realism. Rather, we need
only utilize an extension of its (free) rst-order logic of identity in partic-
ular, an extension that includes quantiers binding nominalvariables, i.e.
variables having proper and common names, vacuous or otherwise, as their
substituends. Because of the connection we want to make with the nominal
variables of Le´sniewskis system, we will use A;B;C;D as the name or nom-
inal variables of conceptual realism. As individual variables, we use x; y; z;
with or without numerical subscripts.
The name, or nominal, variables of conceptual realism are not individual
variables, it should be noted, but represent a syntactic category distinct from
that of either predicate or individual variables. The values of these variables
are neither objects nor predicable concepts, but rather are concepts that are
used in both general and singular reference.17 The common-name concept
man, for example, can be used in a speech act to refer to all men, some
men, most men, one man, two men, etc., depending on the determiner or
kind of referential act in which the concept is being applied. An assertion
of Every man is mortal, e.g., is represented in this logic as (8xA)M(x),
where A is the symbolic counterpart of the common name manand M is a
one-place predicate constant for is mortal. Similarly, an assertion of Some
man is wiseis represented as (9xA)W (x), where W is a one-place predicate
constant for is wise. The quantier phrases (8xA) and (9xA) are taken
to represent referential concepts based on the common-name concept man,
and in particular concepts that have a structure complementary to that of
predicable concepts. In conceptualism, as we understand it here, in other
words, both predicable and referential concepts are unsaturated cognitive
capacities that mutually saturate each other in a speech (or mental) act, the
way that noun phrases and verb phrases are complementary structures that
saturate each other in the formation of a sentence uttered in such an act.
An assertion of Every man is mortaldoes have the same truth conditions
as an assertion of Everything is such that if it is a man then it is mortal,
17Both proper and common names, Peter Geach has pointed out, are di¤erent from
predicate expressions in that they can be used outside the context of a sentence in
simple acts of naming,which are not assertions. (See [Geach 1980], p. 52.) A referential
act is not an act of naming, but it does involve the use of a name together with a determiner
(implicitly if not explicitly), such every, some, the, etc.
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which can be symbolized as
(8x)[(9yA)(x = y)!M(x)];
just as an assertion of Some man is wisehas the same truth conditions as
Something is such that it is a man and is wise, which can be symbolized as
(9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^W (x)]:
Here the quantier phrases (8x) and (9x) are read as everythingand something,
i.e., they are quantiers applied to the ultimate superordinate common name
thing. For convenience, however, we adopt the usual practice of not using an
explicit symbolic counterpart of the common name thingas a part of these
quantier phrases though it is nevertheless understood to be present. Our
point about the above logical forms is that they do not represent the same
speech acts as those represented by (8xA)M(x) and (9xA)W (x). There is a
di¤erence in the cognitive structure of these assertions, and in particular in
the referential and predicable concepts underlying those speech acts. One of
the goals of conceptualism is to give a perspicuous logical representation of
this di¤erence in terms of a conceptualist theory of logical form. As a logistic
system, in other words, conceptualism is concerned with representing both
the cognitive structure of our speech (and mental) acts as well as the truth
conditions of those acts in terms of the recursive operations of logical syntax.
The connection between the two kinds of logical forms is given in terms of
the following meaning postulates (where A is a name variable):
(MP1) (8xA)'$ (8x)[(9yA)(x = y)! '];
(MP2) (9xA)'$ (9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^ ']:
The application of 8 and 9 to proper names in conceptualism represents
the distinction between referential acts in which a proper name is used with,
as opposed to without, existential presupposition. Thus an assertion of Pe-
gasus is wingedin which Pegasusis used referentially without existential
presupposition is symbolized as (8xB)G(x), where B is a name constant for
Pegasusand G is a one-predicate for is winged. By (MP1), this assertion
has the same truth conditions as Anything identical with Pegasus is winged,
which in free logic does not commit us to there being anything identical to
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Pegasus. An assertion of the same sentence used with existential presup-
position is symbolized as (9xB)G(x), which, by (MP2) has the same truth
conditions as Something is identical with Pegasus and is winged.
Complex names are also part of our conceptualist framework, and are
needed in the reduction of Le´sniewskis ontology. In English, complex com-
mon names are generated from more basic common names by attaching a
(dening) relative clause (beginning with that, whoor which) to the lat-
ter, a syntactic device that we adopt in our logistic system as well. We use
for this purpose a new primitive operator, =, which, applied to a name B
and a formula ' results in a complex name B=', which is read as B that
(who, which) is '.18 Thus, an assertion of Every person who works pays
taxesin which the reference is to every person who works, and not to every
person simpliciter, is symbolized as (8B=W (x))T (x), where B is the sym-
bolic counterpart of person, W is a one-place predicate for works, and T
is a one-place predicate for pays taxes. This assertion has the same truth
conditions as Every person is such that if (s)he works, then (s)he pays taxes,
even though the cognitive structure of the two assertions, as based on the
referential and predicable concepts of each, is di¤erent. Their equivalence
is brought out in the following meaning postulate together with a similar
postulate for existential quantier phrases19:
(MP3) (8xB=') $ (8xB)['!  ];
(MP4) (9xB=') $ (9xB)[' ^  ]:
We note that existential generalization, and, similarly, universal instan-
tiation, apply to all names, whether complex or simple, proper or common,
and vacuous (e.g. ctitious) or nonvacuous. Thus, if nothing is an A (e.g. a
18The use of =for this purpose should not be confused with its use in representing the
proper substitution in a formula of one expression for another, as in '(x=y) or '(B=C).
The context will make clear which use is intended. The introduction of complex names
means that formulas and names are to be inductively dened simultaneously as follows:
(1) every name variable (or constant) is a name; (2) where x, y are individual variables,
(x = y) is a formula; and if '; are formulas, B is a name, and x and C are an individual
and name variable, respectively, then (3) :', (4) (' !  ), (5) (8x)', (6) (8xB)', and
(7) (8C)' are formulas, and (8) B=' and (9) =' are (complex) names.
19Strictly speaking, both (MP2) and (MP4) are derivable in the logic from (MP1) and
(MP3), respectively, because 9 is understood to be dened in terms of 8.
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unicorn), then some nominal concept C is such that nothing is a C, which
can be symbolized as follows:
:(9y)(9xA)(y = x)! (9C):(9y)(9xC)(y = x):
It does not follow, of course, that such an inference requires us to give only
a substitutional interpretation to quantiers binding nominal variables. The
following will be taken as the axioms for nominal quantiers20:
Axiom 1: (8C)'! '(B[x]=C); where B is free for C in ' with
respect to x;
Axiom 2: (8C)['!  ]! [(8C)'! (8C) ];
Axiom 3: ['! (8C)']; where C is not free in ':
In addition to these axioms, we assume all tautologous formulas and the
quantier and identity axioms for rst-order logic free of existential presup-
positions.21 As inference rules we assume modus ponens and the rule of
20We assume the obvious denitions of bondage and freedom of occurrences of nominal
variables in formulas, and of the proper substitution in a formula ' of a nominal variable
or constant B for free occurrences of a nominal variable C. A complex name B= is free
for C in ' with respect to an individual variable x (as place holder) if for each variable
y such that (8yC) occurs in ' and C is free at that occurrence, then y is free for x in
B=, and, moreover, that no variable, nominal or individual, other than x that is free in
B= becomes bound when that free occurrence of C in ' is replaced by an occurrence of
B=(y=x). In Axiom 1, it is understood that if B is a complex name, then it is free for C
in ' with respect to a particular variable x and that '(B[x]=C) represents the result of
replacing free occurrences of C by free occurrences of B with respect to x.
21With only :, !, =, and 8 as primitive logical constants (i.e. ^, _, $, and 9 are
assumed dened in the usual way), we can take the following as the quantier and identity
axiom schemas for our free logic:
(8x)['!  ]! [(8x)'! (8x) ];
! (8x);
(8x)(9y)(x = y);
x = x;
x = y ! ['!  ];
where x is not free in , and where  is obtained from ' by replacing one or more free
occurrences of x by a free occurrence of y.
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universal generalization, (UG), for individual and nominal variables. The
rule (UG) for restricted quantiers, i.e.,
if ` '; then ` (8xA)';
is derivable from (MP1) and the rule (UG). From these axioms and rules
it is easy to prove the rules for interchanging provably equivalent formulas
and for rewriting bound individual variables. Where y is free for x in ',
the following qualied version of universal instantiation is provable on the
basis of Leibnizs law (an axiom), universal generalization, and the quantier
axioms:
T1: ` (8x)'! [(9z)(y = z)! '(y=x)]:
Some useful theorems regarding the nominal quantiers are:
T2: ` (8x)'! (8xA)';
which is derivable from (MP1) and tautologous transformations. By taking
' in T2 to be (y 6= z), we have:
T3: ` (9zA)(y = z)! (9z)(y = z):
From this theorem, the rewrite of bound variables rule, and (MP1),
T4: ` (8xA)'! [(9zA)(y = z)! '(y=x)];
then follows, where, again, y is free for x in '. Finally, the following theorem
indicates how unrestricted quantication (over things) is related to nominal
quantication:
T5: ` (8x)'$ (8A)(8xA)';
where the nominal (name) variable A is not free in '. The left-to-right di-
rection follows by T2, (UG), and the quantier axioms for names. The right-
to-left direction follows by rst universally instantiation A to thing identical
to itself, i.e. to =x = x, so that by Axiom 1 we have:
` (8A)(8xA)'! (8x=x = x)':
But, by (MP3),
` (8x=x = x)'! (8x)[x = x! '];
and from this and the axioms for identity, (UG), and the absolute quantier,
` (8x=x = x)'! (8x)';
from which the right-to-left direction of T5 follows.
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3 A Conceptualist Interpretation of
Le´sniewskis System
We now turn to a translation of the rst-order version of Le´sniewskis on-
tology as formulated in section 1. We assume that the nominal variables
a; b; c; d (with or with out numerical subscripts) of this system are correlated
one-to-one with the nominal or name variables A;B;C;D (with or without
numerical subscripts) of our extended rst-order logic of identity that is free
of existential presuppositions; i.e., that A is correlated with a, B is correlated
with b, etc. Because the only atomic formulas of the system are of the form
a " b, the following inductive denition of the translation function trs trans-
lates each formula of Le´sniewskis system into a formula of our alternative
system (with a replaced by A, b by B, etc.):
1. trs(a " b) = (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y);
2. trs(:') = :trs(');
3. trs('!  ) = [trs(')! trs( )];
4. trs((8a)') = (8A)trs('):
Note that an atomic formula a " b is interpreted here as stating that at
most one thing is a and that some a is a b, which has the same truth con-
ditions as saying that exactly one thing is a and that thing is a b. It is
clear that where ' is a logical axiom of the rst-order logic of Le´sniewskis
ontology, then trs(') is a theorem of our extended free rst-order logic of
identity.22 Modus ponens and (UG) in all its forms also preserve validity un-
der trs. Accordingly, to show that this interpretation amounts to a reduction
of Le´sniewskis ontology, we need only prove that trs translates Le´sniewskis
single axiom for his ontology into a theorem of our present system. We will
deal rst with the translation of the left-to-right direction of this axiom, the
consequent of which consists of three conjuncts. For this direction, we need
only show that the translation of a " b yields the translation of each conjunct,
which is established in T8, T10 and T12 below.
22In fact, Axioms 1-3 are just the translations of the quantier axioms assumed in the
rst-order theory for Le´sniewskis ontology (as described in footnote 8). By denition
of trs; moreover, it is obvious that the translation of a tautologous formula is also a
tautologous formula.
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T6: ` (9xA)'! (9xA)(9yA)(x = y):
Proof. By sentential logic, ` (x 6= y) ! [(x = y) ! :']; and therefore,
by (UG) and the quantier axioms, where y is not free in ', ` (8yA)(x 6=
y) ! [(9yA)(x = y) ! :']: Therefore, by sentential logic, ` [(9yA)(x =
y)! (8yA)(x 6= y)]! [(9yA)(x = y)! [(9yA)(x = y)! :']]; from which,
by tautologous transformations, (UG) on x, quantier logic and (MP1) twice,
it follows that ` (8xA)(8yA)(x 6= y) ! (8xA):'; and hence ` (9xA)' !
(9xA)(9yA)(x = y):
T7: ` (9xA)(9yB)(x = y)! (9xA)(9yA)(x = y).
Proof. By T6, where ' is (9yB)(x = y).
T8: ` trs(a " b! (9c)c " a), i.e.,
` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y) ! (9C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^
(9xC)(9yA)(x = y)]:
Proof. By T7, sentential logic and existential generalization of the nom-
inal variable A.
T9: ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y) ! [(9yA)(x = y) !
(9yB)(x = y)]:
Proof. By T4, Leibnizs law, and sentential logic, ` (8yA)(x = y) ^
(9yA)(z = y) ^ (9yB)(z = y) ! (x = z) ^ (9yB)(x = y), and therefore,
by (UG) on z and quantier logic, ` (8yA)(x = y) ^ (9z)[(9yA)(z = y) ^
(9yB)(z = y)] ! (9yB)(x = y), and hence, by (MP2), ` (8yA)(x = y) ^
(9zA)(9yB)(z = y) ! (9yB)(x = y), which, by rewrite of bound variables,
shows that ` (8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y)! (9yB)(x = y). But, by
T4, ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ! [9yA)(x = y) ! (8yA)(x = y)], and therefore
by tautologous transformations, ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x =
y)! [(9yA)(x = y)! (9yB)(x = y)]:
T10: ` trs(a " b! (8c)[c " a! c " b]), i.e.,
` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (9xA)(9yB)(x = y) ! (8C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^
(9xC)(9yA)(x = y)! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yB)(x = y).
Proof. By T9, (UG) on x and quantier laws for (8xC), and then by
sentential logic, (UG) and quantier laws for C.
T11: ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ! [(9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x =
y)! (9xC)(9yD)(x = y)]:
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Proof. By T9, substituting D for B, ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y)^
(9xA)(9yD)(x = y) ! [(9yA)(x = y) ! (9yD)(x = y)]. But, by com-
mutation and identity laws, ` (9yA)(9xD)(y = x) ! (9xD)(9yA)(x = y),
and hence ` (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ! [(9yA)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) !
(9yD)(x = y)]. T11 then follows by (UG) on x and quantier laws for (8xC):
T12: ` trs(a " b ! (8c)(8d)[c " a ^ d " a ! c " d]), i.e., ` (8xA)(8yA)(x =
y)^(9xA)(9yB)(x = y)! (8C)(8D)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y)^(9xC)(9yA)(x =
y) ^ (8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^
(9xC)(9yD)(x = y)].
Proof. By T11, tautologous transformations, (UG) with respect to C
and D, and quantier laws for (8C) and (8D).
By T8, T10, and T12, the translation of the left-to-right direction of
Le´sniewskis axiom for ontology is provable in our extended identity logic.
We will break down our proof of the converse direction into two parts, each
dealing with one of the two conjuncts in our translation of a " b. In the rst
part, which is T15 below, we show that
` trs((9c)c " a ^ (8c)[c " a! c " b])! (9xA)(9yB)(x = y),
and in the second, which is T22 below, we show that
` trs((9c)c " a ^ (8c)(8d)[c " a ^ d " a! c " d])! (8xA)(8yA)(x = y):
T13: ` (8yC)(x = y)! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y):
Proof. By T4, (UG) on y and quantier laws for (8yC), ` (8yC)(x =
y) ! [(9yC)(z = y) ! (8yC)(z = y)], and therefore, by (UG) on z and
quantier laws for (8z), ` (8yC)(x = y)! (8zC)(8yC)(z = y), from which
T13 follows by the rewrite law for bound variables.
T14: ` (9x)[(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yC)(x = y) ^ (9yA)(x = y)]^
(8C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ! (9xC)(9yB)(x = y)] !
(9xA)(9yB)(x = y):
Proof. By T4, ` (8yC)(x = y) ! [(9yC)(z = y) ! x = z], and
by Leibnizs law, ` (9yB)(z = y) ! [x = z ! (9yB)(x = y)], and
hence, by (UG) on z , tautologous transformations and quantier laws for z,
` (8yC)(x = y) ! [(9z)[(9yC)(z = y) ^ (9yB)(z = y)] ! (9yB)(x = y)].
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But then, by (MP2) and the rewrite law for bound variables, ` (8yC)(x =
y) ! [(9xC)(9yB)(x = y) ! (9yB)(x = y)], from which it follows by
sentential logic that ` (8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yC)(x = y) ^ (9yA)(x = y) !
[(9xC)(9yB)(x = y)! (9yA)(x = y)^(9yB)(x = y)]. Accordingly, by (UG)
and quantier laws for x, ` (9x)[(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yC)(x = y) ^ (9yA)(x =
y)] ! [(9xC)(9yB)(x = y) ! (9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^ (9yB)(x = y)]]. Fi-
nally, we note that by (MP2), ` (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) $ (9x)[(9yC)(x =
y) ^ (9yA)(x = y)], and therefore, by T13 and universal instantiation of C,
` (9x)[(8yC)(x = y)^(9yC)(x = y)^(9yA)(x = y)]^(8C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x =
y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y)]! (9xC)(9yB)(x = y), from which T14 follows.
T15: ` trs((9c)c " a ^ (8c)[c " a! c " b])! (9xA)(9yB)(x = y), i.e.,
` (9C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y)] ^ (8C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x =
y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yB)(x = y)] !
(9xA)(9yB)(x = y).
Proof. By (MP2), T4, and quantier logic, ` (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^
(9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ! (9x)[(9yC)(x = y) ^ (8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yA)(x = y)],
from which, together T14, T15 follows.
We now turn to showing the translation of the second part of the right-to-
left direction of Le´sniewskis axiom. Some useful theorems for this purpose
are the following.
T16: ` (8x)'$ (8x)[(9y)(x = y)! ']:
Proof. By T1, (UG) on x, and identity and quantier axioms.
T17: ` (9x)'$ (9x)[(9y)(x = y) ^ ']:
Proof. By T16, denition of 9; and tautologous transformations.
T18: ` (8x=x = z)'$ (8x)[x = z ! ']:
Proof. By (MP3), ` (8x=x = z)'$ (8x)[(9y=y = z)(x = y)! '], and
by (MP4), ` (9y=y = z)(x = y)$ (9y)[(9w)(y = w)^(y = z)^(x = z)], and
therefore by T17 and Leibnizs law, ` (9y=y = z)(x = y) $ (9y)(x = y) ^
(x = z). Hence, ` (8x)[(9y=y = z)(x = y)! ']$ (8x)[(9y)(x = y)! (x =
z ! ')], and therefore, by quantier axioms, ` 8x)[(9y=y = z)(x = y) !
'] ! [(8x)(9y)(x = y) ! (8x)(x = z ! ')], which, by an identity axiom,
yields the left-to-right direction of T18. For the converse direction, note that
by sentential logic, ` (8x)[x = z ! ']! (8x)[(9y)(x = y)! (x = z ! ')],
and therefore, by above biconditional, ` (8x)[x = z ! '] ! (8x)[(9y=y =
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z)(x = y)! '], and hence ` (8x)[x = z ! ']! (8x=x = z)', which is the
right-to-left direction of T18.
T19: ` (8x=x = z)(8y=y = z)(x = y):
Proof. By T18 twice, ` (8x=x = z)(8y=y = z)(x = y) $ (8x)[x = z !
(8y)(y = z ! x = y)]; from which T19 follows by identity logic.
T20: ` (9x=x = z)(9yA)(x = y)$ (9yA)(z = y):
Proof. By (MP4), ` (9x=x = z)(9yA)(x = y) $ (9x)[(x = z) ^
(9yA)(x = y)]; and therefore, by quantier axioms and Leibnizs law,
` (9x=x = z)(9yA)(x = y)! (9yA)(z = y), which is the left-to-right direc-
tion of T20. For the converse direction, note that, by (MP2), ` (9yA)(z =
y)$ (9y)[(9xA)(y = x)^(z = y)], and hence, by rewrite of bound variables,
` (9yA)(z = y) $ (9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^ (z = x)], from which, by identity
logic, it follows that ` (9yA)(z = y) ! (9x)[(x = z) ^ (9yA)(x = y)]; and
therefore, by (MP4), ` (9yA)(z = y)! (9x=x = z)(9yA)(x = y).
T21: ` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y)!
(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)]! (8xA)(8yA)(x = y):
Proof. By Axiom 1, substituting thing identical to x0, i.e. =z = x0 forD
with respect to the variable z, ` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y)^(9xD)(9yA)(x =
y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)] ! [(8x=x = x0)(8y=y =
x0)(x = y) ^ (9x=x = x0)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9x=x =
x0)(9yC)(x = y)]. But, by T19, ` (8x=x = x0)(8y=y = x0)(x = y), and, by
T20 (twice), ` (9x=x = x0)(9yA)(x = y) $ (9yA)(x0 = y) and ` (9x=x =
x0)(9yC)(x = y) $ (9yC)(x0 = y), and therefore ` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x =
y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)] !
[(9yA)(x0 = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yC)(x0 = y)]: Also, by sub-
stituting y0 for x0 in this last theorem, ` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^
(9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)] !
[(9yA)(y0 = y)! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9yC)(y0 = y), and hence
` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x =
y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)] ! [(9yA)(x0 = y) ^ (9yA)(y0 = y) ! x0 =
y0]. Then, by (UG) on x0 and y0, and quantier axioms for x0 and y0,
` (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x =
y) ^ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y)]! (8x0)[(9yA)(x0 = y)! (8y0)[(9yA)(y0 = y)!
x0 = y0]], from which T21 follows by (MP1) and the rewrite law for bound
variables.
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T22: ` trs((9c)c " a^(8c)(8d)[c " a^d " a! c " d])! (8xA)(8yA)(x = y),
i.e., ` (9C)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y)]^
(8C)(8D)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ^ (8xD)(8yD)(x =
y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yD)(x = y)] !
(8xA)(8yA)(x = y):
Proof. By Axiom 1, ` (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y)] ^
(8C)(8D)[(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ^ (8xD)(8yD)(x =
y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) ! (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yD)(x = y)] !
(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (8D)[(8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y)] !
(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yD)(x = y)]. But, by commutation law,
` (9xC)(9yD)(x = y) $ (9xD)(9yC)(x = y), and therefore, by T21,
` (8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y)] ^ (8C)(8D)[(8xC)(8yC)(x =
y) ^ (9xC)(9yA)(x = y) ^ (8xD)(8yD)(x = y) ^ (9xD)(9yA)(x = y) !
(8xC)(8yC)(x = y) ^ (9xC)(9yD)(x = y)] ! (8xA)(8yA)(x = y), from
which, by (UG) and quantier laws on C, T22 follows.
By T15 and T22, we now have as theorems both the left-to-right and the
right-to-left directions of our translation of Le´sniewskis axiom for ontology.
We conclude, accordingly, that Le´sniewskis axiom is a theorem of our system
under the translation trs, and hence that the translation of every theorem
of Le´sniewskis rst-order theory of ontology is a theorem of our system.
Metatheorem 1: If ' is a theorem of Le´sniewskis rst-order theory of
ontology based on the relation of singular inclusion (but not also his theory
of creative denitions of name-forming functors), then trs(') is a theorem of
the free rst-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantiers.
4 Reduction of Le´sniewskis Theory of De-
nitions
The parenthetical qualication in metatheorem 1 above can be dropped, it
turns out, because there is an extension of the rst-order version of Le´sniewskis
ontology described in section one in which Le´sniewskis theory of denitions
can be shown to be noncreative, and that extension is also reducible to our
extended rst-order logic of identity. The extension in question has been
referred to as Le´sniewskis elementary ontology,or more simply as the sys-
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tem EO.23 This system is obtained from the rst-order theory described in
section one by adding the following two axioms (which are special cases of a
more general comprehension principle, which is derivable in EO):
(Compl) (8a)(9b)(8c)[c"b$ c"c ^ c /"a];
(Conj) (8a)(8b)(9c)(8d)[d"c$ d"a ^ d"b]:
These axioms, expressed in terms of our conceptualist logic, posit the
existence of a complementary nominal concept corresponding to any given
nominal concept A (which can be read in English as thing that is not an
A) as well as the existence of a conjunctive nominal concept determined by
arbitrary nominal concepts A and B (which can be read in English as thing
that is both an A and a B). The Translations of both (Compl) and (Conj)
are derivable from special instances of the following comprehension principle:
(CP) (8A)(9B)(8x)[(9yB)(x = y)$ (9yA)(x = y)]:
This comprehension principle is immediately derivable from Axiom 1 (or
rather from the contrapositive of Axiom 1, which amounts to a form of ex-
istential generalization for nominal concepts). By (CP) and Axiom 1, sub-
stituting for A the complex name form =:(9zA)(y = z) (which is read as
thing that is not an A), we have
` (9B)(8x)[(9yB)(x = y)$ (9y=:(9zA)(y = z))(x = y)];
from which, by (MP4) and Leibnizs law, it follows that
` (9B)(8x)[(9yB)(x = y)$ :(9zA)(x = z)];
which a¢ rms the existence of a nominal concept that is the complement
of A. Finally, by proofs similar to those given in section three, it can be
shown on the basis of this last theorem that the translation of (Compl), i.e.
trs(Compl), is provable in our conceptualist logic of identity.
23See [Iwanu´s 1973]. Strictly speaking, EO also contains several noncreative denitional
axioms that are justied (eliminable) on the basis of the two axioms listed here. The trans-
lations of each of these denitions is also provable in our extended rst-order conceptualist
logic of identity.
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Similarly, by (rewriting B to C in) (CP) and Axiom 1, substituting now
for A the complex name form =(9zA)(y = z) ^ (9zB)(y = z) (which is read
as thing that is both an A and a B), we have
` (9C)(8x)[(9yC)(x = y)$ (9y=(9zA)(y = z) ^ (9zB)(y = z))(x = y)];
which, by (MP4), reduces to
` (9C)(8x)[(9yC)(x = y)$ (9y)[(9zA)(y = z) ^ (9zB)(y = z) ^ y = x]];
and hence, by Leibnizs law, to
` (9C)(8x)[(9yC)(x = y)$ (9zA)(x = z) ^ (9zB)(x = z)];
which a¢ rms the existence of a nominal concept corresponding to the con-
junction of being both an A and a B. Again, by proofs similar to those
in section three, it can be shown on the basis of this last theorem that the
translation of (Conj), i.e. trs(Conj), is provable in our conceptualist logic of
identity.
Metatheorem 2: If ' is a theorem of EO, Le´sniewskis system of ele-
mentary ontology (including his theory of denitions), then trs(') is a the-
orem of the free rst-order logic of identity extended to include nominal
quantiers.
5 Consistency and Decidability
It has been shown in [Iwanus 1973] that Le´sniewskis system of elementary
ontology is decidable, i.e., that it is decidable for any formula of EO whether
or not it is a theorem of EO. We will show here that our present conceptualist
system to which EO has been reduced is also decidable as well as consistent.
First, let us note that by (MP3) and a simple inductive argument it can be
shown that every formula of our conceptualist system in which a complex
name occurs is provably equivalent to a formula in which no complex name
occurs.
Metatheorem 3: If ' is a formula of our free rst-order logic extended
to include nominal (name) variables, quantication over such, and restricted
quantiers with respect to such, then there is a formula  in which no complex
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name occurs such that ' is provably equivalent to  in this logic, i.e., ` '$
 .
Because of the above metatheorem, we can, in what follows, restrict our-
selves to formulas in which no complex name occurs.24 We assume a one-
to-one correlation of the nominal variables A;B;C;D, etc., with one-place
predicate variables FA; FB; FC ; FD; etc., and inductively dene a translation
function trs from the formulas of our extended free rst-order logic of iden-
tity in which no complex name occurs into formulas of second-order monadic
predicate logic (with identity) as follows:
1. trs(x = y) = (x = y);
2. trs(:') = :trs(');
3. trs('!  ) = [trs(')! trs( )];
4. trs((8x)') = (8x)trs(');
5. trs((8xA)') = (8x)[FA(x)! '];
6. trs((8A)') = (8FA)trs(').
It is clear that the translation under trs of every theorem of our extended
free rst-order logic of identity with nominal quantiers in which no complex
name occurs becomes a theorem of second-order monadic predicate logic.
The restriction to formulas in which no complex names occur can be dropped
by allowing, for each formula ' in which a complex name does occur, the
translation function trs to assign trs( ) to ', where  is the rst formula
(in terms of some alphabetic ordering) in which no complex name occurs
and such that ` ' $  . By extending trs in this way, it then follows
that every theorem of our conceptualist logic, i.e., our extended free rst-
order logic of identity, is translated into a theorem of second-order monadic
predicate logic, and hence, given the known consistency of the latter, that our
conceptualist system is consistent. Accordingly, by metatheorem 2, it follows
that the product translation function, trs=trs, translates every theorem of
Le´sniewskis elementary ontology into a theorem of second-order monadic.
predicate logic, which, as is well-known, is decidable.25
24We also ignore name constants and concern ourselves only with formulas in which no
applied descriptive constants occur.
25See, e.g., [Church 1956], p. 303.
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Metatheorem 4: If ' is a theorem of our present conceptualist logic,
then trs(') is a theorem of second-order monadic predicate logic; and, sim-
ilarly, if ' is a theorem of EO, then trs(trs(')) is also a theorem of second-
order monadic predicate logic. Therefore, both our present conceptualist
logic and EO are consistent.
To prove the decidability of our conceptualist logic we rst note that
every theorem of second-order monadic predicate logic can be translated
into a theorem of our conceptualist logic, and hence that the one system
is essentially equivalent to the other. Because monadic predicate variables
are in a one-to-one correspondence with nominal variables, we can take
each predicate variable to have the form FA, where A is the nominal variable
corresponding to that predicate variable. The translation function, trs0, is
dened as follows:
1. trs0(x = y) = (x = y);
2. trs0(FA(x)) = (9yA)(x = y); where y is the rst individual variable
other than x;
3. trs0(:') = :trs0(');
4. trs0('!  ) = (trs0(')! trs0( ));
5. trs0((8x)') = (8x)trs0(');
6. trs0((8FA)') = (8A)trs0(').
It is easily seen that the translation under trs0 of each axiom of second-
order monadic predicate logic is a theorem of our conceptualist system. The
comprehension principle, for example, which is formulated as follows:
(9FA)(8x)[FA(x)$ '];
where FA is not free in ', and which can be taken as an axiom instead of the
universal instantiation law, has the following as its translation:
(9A)(8x)[(9yA)(x = y)$ trs0(')]:
This formula can be derived from the following instance of (CP), the com-
prehension principle of our conceptualist logic:
(9A)(8x)[(9yA)(x = y)$ (9y=trs0('(y=x))(x = y)];
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where y is free for x in ' (and therefore in trs0(')). That is, by (MP4) and
elementary transformations, the above instance of (CP) is equivalent to:
(9A)(8x)[(9yA)(x = y)$ (9y)(trs0('(y=x)) ^ (x = y))];
which in turn, by identity logic, is equivalent to:
(9A)(8x)[(9yA)(x = y)$ trs0(')]:
Metatheorem 5: If ' is a theorem of second-order monadic predicate
logic, then trs0(') is a theorem of our present conceptualist logic.
Finally, by metatheorem 3, to show that our conceptualist logic is decid-
able, we need only show that the formulas of this logic in which no complex
names occur are decidable. To show this we prove the following metatheorem
by induction on these formulas.
Metatheorem 6: If ' is a formula of our conceptualist logic and no
complex names occur in ', then ` '$ trs0(trs(')).
Proof. As noted, we prove this metatheorem by induction on the formu-
las of our conceptualist logic in which no complex names occur. The case for
atomic formulas, which consist only of identities, is of course immediate; and
for negations and conditionals, again the proof is immediate. Suppose the
metatheorem holds for '; then again it follows immediately that it holds for
(8A)'. The only interesting case is for (8xA)'. But, by denition of trs,
trs((8xA)') = (8x)[FA(x) ! trs(')], and therefore, by denition of trs0,
trs0(trs((8xA)')) = (8x)[(9yA)(x = y) ! trs0(trs('))]; and therefore, by
the inductive hypothesis and (MP1), ` (8xA)' $ (8x)[(9yA)(x = y) !
trs0(trs('))], which completes our proof by induction.
It follows, accordingly, that if ' is a formula of our conceptualist logic
in which no complex names occur, then to decide whether or not ' is a
theorem of this logic it su¢ ces to decide whether or not trs(') is a theorem
of second-order monadic predicate logic. If the latter is not a theorem of
second-order monadic predicate logic, then, by metatheorem 4, ' is not a
theorem of our conceptualist logic; and if trs(') is a theorem of second-
order monadic predicate logic, then, by metatheorem 5, trs0(trs(')) is a
theorem of our conceptualist logic, and therefore, by metatheorem 6, so is '.
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Hence, by metatheorem 3, the decision problem for our conceptualist logic is
reducible to that of second-order monadic predicate logic.
Metatheorem 7: Our present conceptualist logic is both consistent
and decidable.
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